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Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000700020001-9

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24 JUN 1975


MEMORANDUM FOR: The Comptroller, CIA

SUBJECT: USIB Committee Staffing

1. At the meeting of USIB Committee Chairmen on 17 June 1975, the DCI indicated the possibility of reprogramming personnel ceiling allocation from positions being eliminated as a result of the drawdown in Southeast Asia. In response to his suggestion, I have reviewed critical manpower requirements needed to properly staff the USIB Committee structure.

2. As a result, I recommend that 18 positions be reallocated from the FY 76 personnel ceiling to accommodate these needs. Basically, additional positions are needed to provide necessary staff for requirements review, planning efforts, special study groups, and USIB staffing actions in a number of Community endeavors and in support of the DCI's leadership role. The need is as follows:

- 5 positions are needed to staff a SIGINT Committee requirements and validation mechanism



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- 2 positions are needed to monitor Community security actions including the analysis of the continuing and serious erosion of highly classified intelligence through leaks, the study of the security compartmentation procedures and their relevant costs, and other Security Committee activities

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- 3 positions are needed to augment the Information Handling Committee staff--for crisis monitoring projects and for ADP R&D and special dissemination projects
- 4 positions are needed to provide additional staff for the Human Sources Committee.

3. It is our intention to use existing organizations to the maximum in dealing with major issues confronting these Committees. However, we have found that in these days of shrinking resources, there is an inclination among Community agencies to concentrate resources on those items of direct and priority concern to the organization and cut back or forego community efforts of "common concern." In the SIGINT arena for instance, the heavy burden imposed by a large-scale requirements review will no longer be picked up by the participating agencies, and they look to the DCI for resource relief. The potential savings from such a review make it mandatory the staff be provided to conduct it.

4. I am attaching copies of the requirements received from the Committee Chairmen. You will note that I have reduced their request by 16 positions. We can provide further detailed justification on request.

SIGNED

[Redacted]
Acting Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community

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Attachments: as stated

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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
SIGINT COMMITTEE
OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

19 June 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: D/DCI/IC

SUBJECT: Staff Manpower Requirements for the SIGINT Requirements Validation and Evaluation Subcommittee (SIRVES)

1. The SIGINT Committee will soon propose to the USIB, the adoption of a new SIGINT requirements mechanism to be designated the National SIGINT Requirements System (NSRS). The community focal point for implementing the system will be the SIGINT Requirements Validation and Evaluation Subcommittee which will replace the IGS. To execute the vastly enlarged functional responsibilities of the SIRVES, as compared to those assigned to the IGS, the SIRVES will require a permanent staff. In addition to the Chairman, the forecasted manpower requirements are as follows:

Task Team I - (COMINT)

4 - 05's/04's or GS equivalent

Task Team II - (ELINT)

2 - 05's/04's or GS equivalent

Task Team III - (Telemetry)

1 - 05/04 or GS equivalent

Secretarial

1 - Secretary (Steno) - GS-6

1 - Clerk Typist - GS-4

2.. As indicated above the permanent staff will comprise three small teams of varying size. The number of staff personnel required to handle the new requirements and evaluation process reflects the relative proportion of COMINT, ELINT and Telemetry requirements now on the books. We think this proportion will probably continue in the future. The functional responsibilities of the permanent staff are attached.

3. The modus operandi for the new SIRVES is a marked change from that of the IGS. The IGS has no permanently assigned

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personnel other than the Chairman. Moreover it did not (nor was it staffed to) completely review all SIGINT requirements and evaluate SIGINT responses on an annual basis. If SIRVES is to respond to the charge of the DCI to "take a hard look" at all SIGINT requirements to positively insure the proper application of all U.S. SIGINT resources, a new mechanism such as that soon to be proposed by the SIGINT Committee, is vital. That mechanism can be effective only if SIRVES is provided a full-time staff.

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Incl:
a/s



Chairman

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SIGINT REQUIREMENTS VALIDATION AND EVALUATION SUBCOMMITTEE (SIRVES)
STAFF FUNCTIONS

The functional responsibilities of the permanent staff will be:

- a. To receive, record and acknowledge receipt of all SIGINT requirements.
- b.. Review requirements supporting data for adequacy.
- c. Obtain additional supporting data when the original submission is deficient.
- d. Conduct an initial review of each requirement and prepare recommendations for action by SIRVES.
- e. Prepare documentation folders on each requirement so that SIRVES may formally act on each requirement with dispatch.
- f. Identify specific SIGINT end-product and/or technical data issued in response to each requirement.
- g. Prepare initial evaluations of the responsiveness of the U.S. SIGINT system to each requirement for consideration by SIRVES.
- h. Issue changes, deletions, additions to the National SIGINT Requirements List (NSRL).
- i. Closely monitor the NSRL on a continuing basis to insure completeness and accuracy.
- j. Draft correspondence on SIGINT requirements and evaluation matters in support of the Chairman, SIRVES.

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**UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
SECURITY COMMITTEE**

19 June 1975

1. The Chairman, USIB Security Committee, requests favorable consideration of a proposal to increase the Committee Staff with the addition of two professional officers (GS 14-15) and a later addition of one secretary (GS 6-7).

2. The current staff consists of the Executive Secretary and one GS-9 Intelligence Assistant. This staff, augmented by a GS-14 officer whose contract expired 13 June 1975, was adequate for the implementation period of the revised Security Committee but satisfaction of current and future requirements calls for additional personnel.

3. Requirements include:

a. Careful analysis must be made of an ever increasing number of leaks of sensitive (and properly classified) intelligence data and practical and possible steps devised to curtail such leaks. The Rockefeller Commission report states "Presidential concern was continually voiced, during every administration since the establishment of the CIA, that the sources of news leaks be determined and the leaks themselves stopped -- by whatever means. In addition, the Committee of the United States Intelligence Board charged with investigating news leaks has historically taken no definitive action to solve the problem." The report recommends "In cases involving serious or continuing security violations, as determined by the Security Committee of the United States Intelligence Board, the Committee should be authorized to recommend in writing to the Director of Central Intelligence (with a copy to the National Security Council) that the case be referred to the FBI for further investigation, under procedures to be developed by the Attorney General."

b. A study, and continuing appraisal, of compartmentation procedures is necessary to see that the most sensitive secrets are carefully protected but that there is a proper flow of other classified intelligence information to a wider area so that proper intelligence functions can be performed.

c. Three active subcommittees (Compartmentation, Technical Surveillance Countermeasures, and Computer Security) of the Security

Committee must be closely followed to see their missions, and specific tasks, are properly carried out. The Chairmen of these subcommittees are from different agencies (CIA, State, and NSA) and, while they are in frequent contact with the Chairman and Executive Secretary of the Security Committee, closer coordination is desired to obtain the maximum from the expertise of the subcommittees in their respective areas.

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19 June 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: EO/ICS

SUBJECT : Slots Needed for Human Sources Committee Support

1. In compliance with the requirements set at this morning's staff meeting, I am attaching staffing requirements for the HSC prepared at my request by the Executive Secretariat of the HSC. I have reviewed these staffing requirements and believe that they are justified.

2. This submission supplants all of the ^{HSC} slots requested in our memorandum of 25 April 1975 on IC/HUMINT budget projection.

3. The reference to detailees on the last page of the attachment is merely a suggestion that the slots requested could be "borrowed" from the other components. It is my understanding, however, from the discussion this morning that the concept proposed was the full transfer of slots from other components because those components had no further need for them.

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C/HB/ICS

Attachment:
As stated

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Support Structure for the Human Sources Committee

Summary. This proposes a permanent staffing arrangement for the Human Sources Committee of USIB. The new Chairman would be a full-time employee or be supported by a Deputy Chairman. A permanent Secretariat should be established. A minimum Secretariat staff would consist of seven professionals, one or two assistants, and at least two clericals. Most of the professionals would be detailed to the Secretariat on 2-3 year rotational assignments from elements of CIA and from other Agencies.

Background. Currently there are no full-time people working for the HSC. General Wilson serves as Chairman in addition to his more than full-time job as Director of the Intelligence Community Staff. The Executive Secretary [] serves at the same time as the Deputy Chief of the Human Sources Group of the Collection Guidance and Assessments Staff, DDI. Secretariat support is provided by that Group. Four professionals from CGAS/HSG (in addition to [] provide support on a time-available basis; the HSC-sponsored CIRL is also produced in the Group; one senior secretary spends most of her time on Committee matters. (Given an increase in competing demands, the continuation of the existing high level of HSC support is problematical.) Acting Chairman Wilson also receives assistance on HSC and other Humint matters from two professionals in the IC Staff/Humint Branch.

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Changing Circumstances. The HSC became a permanent USIB committee in the summer of 1974. Since that time, and especially since the selection of General Wilson as Acting Chairman, the Committee has become increasingly busy (and hopefully productive). An Action Program for Calendar Year 1975 was adopted; it consists of five major Objectives and several dozen Tasks. Certain of these Tasks are of considerable magnitude (e.g., Project FOCUS, the development of a National Humint Plan, the Humint R&D Program, the role of the HSC in the KIQ strategy and KIQ evaluation programs). Additional Tasks are being proposed weekly, and the HSC has become one of the most active of the USIB committees.

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The activity of the HSC exceeds the handling capacities of the current part-time mechanisms. This is the opinion of General Wilson and of the State, CIA, and DIA Members of the Executive Steering Group. Though the Secretariat and the Humint Branch of the IC Staff work long and hard, important Committee tasks are being deferred because of the lack of personnel to do the necessary work. And at this point in the history of the Intelligence Community, it is especially important that the DCI be given all appropriate advice and assistance by the HSC "in the discharge of his responsibilities for the efficient allocation and effective use of community resources for the collection of positive foreign intelligence information through human sources."

Organizational Options. Presumably, the Chairman will occupy a slot provided by the Intelligence Community Staff. The Secretariat could be placed either in the IC Staff or remain located in the DDI (a la COMIREX). Placement in the IC Staff would clarify any ambiguities regarding the supervision of the Secretariat. On the other hand, the DDI option allows the Office of the Chairman to draw upon additional Intelligence Directorate resources; emphasizes the DDI role in support of the Director as head of the Intelligence Community; and such dispersion disguises the magnitude of Intelligence Community-related support. The DDI option probably is available only if almost all additional Secretariat slots are provided from outside the Directorate. If the Secretariat is maintained in the Intelligence Directorate, it should be at least a quasi-independent unit, organizationally separate, but cooperating, with CGAS/HSG.

Assumptions. The need for permanent Secretariat staffing is based upon assumptions such as the following:

A. A National Humint Plan is prepared and updated annually.

B. There is an increased Committee role in the development of KIQ Strategy Reports and a developing role re KEP.

C. continues with increased staff support.

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D. A R&D concern continues as does concern with training and orientation.

E. Some sort of human sources inventory is developed and maintained in conjunction with CIRIS.

F. Guidance activities continue, to include interagency airgrams, official/informal letters, Skylink calls, selected manuals, and the CIRL or some follow-up vehicle.

G. Resource studies are conducted for consideration by IRAC and other users.

H. Concern regarding relationships with other Committees receives increasing attention (and committees such as IDC may be subsumed under the HSC).

I. Some standing HSC substructure is established within the next year (e.g., a Guidance Subcommittee, a Subcommittee on Humint R&D).

Slotting Needs. See attached.

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Proposed HSC Staff

Chairman GS-18 or equivalent
(If there is not a full time Chairman, there should be a Vice Chairman.)

Executive Secretary GS-15/16
--runs the day-to-day business of the Office of the Chairman
--serves as Chairman, Executive Steering Group, which has certain planning and review responsibilities
--monitors for the Chairman the diverse activities of HSC task groups, project leaders, etc.
--advises the Chairman on Committee matters

Professionals

* GS-14/15: Deputy Executive Secretary, Guidance Coordinator (Skylink, manuals, inter-agency letters, cables, requirements, briefings, etc.)

* GS-14 Assessments Coordinator [redacted] special assessments, projects)

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* GS 13/14 Planning Officer (National Humint Plan, KIQ Strategies)

* GS-13/14 R&D and Training Officer (R&D task team/subcommittee; concerned with adequacy of training for collectors; special projects)

* GS-13/14 Guidance/Assessments Officer (also liaison with overt collectors)

* GS-12/13 Guidance/Assessments Officer (also liaison with non-overt collectors)

Assistants

* GS-10/12 Inventory Control Officer (maintains machine record of size, location, function, cost of human source collection/reporting elements)

Clericals

* GS-09 Secretary to Chairman

* GS-07/08 Secretary

* GS-05 Clerk

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Detailees

Suggest that professionals be acquired on detail
(with slots provided from contributing component).

Detailees could be two DDI [redacted]
[redacted] one DDS&T, one DDO, two DOD, one State.

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DCI/IC 75-1526

19 June 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: EO/ICS

SUBJECT: Augmentation of Staffing for USIB IHC

25X1 1. Attached is a realistic, no frills proposal for augmented IHC staffing in response to [] request. I will not belabor in this memorandum the need justification -- all one needs to do is to refer to the present draft of Part III of the DCI Perspectives to note the major problems IHC is called on to address for the DCI and community.

25X1 2. This proposal is for staffing over and above our present numbers. Also, because the subject matter is so interrelated with ours, I have included a request for 4 new staffers to work directly for [] ICS/PRD. It is not significant to this memorandum whether technically they are PRD or IHC; we are all working together harmoniously.

3. The augmentation requested is as follows:

a. For warning and crisis operations.

(1) Two case analysis officers, GS 12/13 and GS 14/15. One intelligence assistant, GS 09/10. One secretary, GS 08.

(2) Working directly for [] these people form an analysis and research team on crisis situations that have occurred, and is prepared to monitor a potential new crisis and maintain a chronograph of events. They highlight problems of communications, interagency coordination, and the quality of performance and operation of the intelligence alerting system and the national nervous system. Their focus is on system operational effectiveness and not on substantive intelligence evaluations -- they support ICS/PRD and NIOs by providing organized data for their appraisals.

(3) Personnel experienced as DDO reports officers should possess some important qualifications and experience.

b. R&D Assistant to Chairman IHC.

(1) One intelligence officer, GS 14/15, or military officer, 04/05.

(2) Serve as technical assistant in R&D matters to C/IHC and provide technical support to all other members of IHC Support Staff. Prepares IC Staff recommendations on technical aspects of the implementation throughout the intelligence community of automated analyst support systems and automated telecommunications networks. Maintains continuing liaisons with the IR&D Council, ARPA, research institutions and contractors on such subjects as mass computer memory, very large data bases, intelligent terminals, new capabilities for computer graphics, technical improvements in intelligence presentation means to users, hardware characteristics, etc. Interagency negotiations.

c. Intelligence Analyst Support

(1) One GS 14/15 intelligence analyst or military equivalent (04/05).

(2) Evaluates automated systems and procedures to support the work of community intelligence production analysts. Organizes and directs community coordinated approaches to such common problems as improved data standards, sharing of technology on automation of analytic work and methodologies, common use of microforms, and improvements in the organization and formatting of foreign intelligence topical files and data bases. Fosters interagency joint planning for automated systems and capabilities, such as analyst/terminal interface.

(3) Should possess general intelligence experience, a fairly good knowledge of library science or equivalent, and experience with computers as a technical discipline (less than a computer science engineer; more than a casual user). Must be effective in interagency negotiations on behalf of DCI and IC Staff. Must write well, particularly staff studies.

d. Secretarial Support to C/IHC and IHC/SS

with (1) One GS-09 *secretary* ~~secretary~~ steno to support entire staff. This augmentation would ~~provide~~ two secretaries to serve IHC/SS, which under this augmentation proposal would consist of 2 GS-16s, 1 GS-15, 2 GS 14s and an Intelligence Assistant (now present), augmented by 3 GS 14/15s (not including augmentation).

e. Imagery Dissemination Systems


(1) One GS-15 S&T intelligence analyst with engineering background.

(2) To direct an interagency project leading to the development and installation of a community operating system for imagery dissemination, as directed by DCI. To monitor, evaluate and report on all community plans and prospective developments relating to automated systems for imagery dissemination, also as directed by D/DCI/IC.

(3) This position is now being filled effectively by a person made available substantially full time by DDI and DDS&T, officially assigned to the DDI Special Study Group. He may be reassigned during calendar year 1976. In that event, a replacement of equivalent qualifications would be required. Accordingly, this amounts to a contingent request for this billet.

4. A more detailed statement of tasks and qualifications is available if desired.

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Chairman IHC

Distribution:

Orig - addressee

- 1 - IC Registry
- 1 - IHC Subject (Personnel)
- 1 - IHC Reading file
- 1 - PRD

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OV 11(5)

[REDACTED]
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF

23 June 1975

Executive Registry

75-6951

NOTED BY DCI
6/24/75

NOTE FOR THE DIRECTOR

Bill:

As you suggested at the USIB Committee Chairmen's meeting, I have provided to Jack Iams the manpower requirements and justifications for slots for [REDACTED] new SIGINT Requirements arrangement (5), Human Sources Committee (4), Information Handling (3), and Security Committee (2). While this appears heavy, a more formal justification will be provided later for your consideration if the Agency saves the slots from Congress.

[REDACTED]
AD/DCI/IC

INFORMATION

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The Director's copy (attached) of this memo wasn't sent to the Director.
Ben Evans has signed off & sent it back to us.

Do you want the Director to see it? I believe you may have already handed
the Director a note earlier today concerning this.

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24 June

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